RESOLVED: Shareholders request that our Board take all practicable steps in its control to initiate and adopt a recapitalization plan for all outstanding stock to have one vote per share. We recommend that this be done through a phase-out process in which the board would, within seven years or other timeframe justified by the board, establish fair and appropriate mechanisms through which disproportionate rights of Class B shareholders could be eliminated. This is not intended to unnecessarily limit our Board's judgment in crafting the requested change in accordance with applicable laws and existing contracts.

SUPPORTING STATEMENT:

In our company’s dual-class voting structure, Class B stock has 10 times the voting rights of Class A. As a result, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. McKelvey together own less 15% of shares but control over 62% of the shareholder vote. These facts raise concerns that the interests of public shareholders may be subordinated to those of our co-founders.

A variety of corporate governance experts illustrate a growing concern about multi-class share structures:

• As of July 2017, the S&P Dow Jones Indices announced that certain indices will no longer add companies with multiple share class structures;
• The executive director of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) has stated that “multi-class structures … rob shareholders of the power to press for change when something goes wrong” and recommends a seven year phase-out of dual class share offerings;
• The International Corporate Governance Network supports CII’s recommendation “to require to a time-based sunset clause for dual class shares to revert to a traditional one-share/one-vote structure no more than seven years after a company’s IPO date.”
• The Council for Institutional Investors (CII) recommends a seven year phase-out of dual class share offerings. The International Corporate Governance Network supports CII’s recommendation “to require to a time-based sunset clause for dual class shares to revert to a traditional one-share/one-vote structure no more than seven years after a company’s IPO date.”
• The Investor Stewardship Group recommends that “shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their economic interest” and “boards should have a strong, independent leadership structure.”
• As of November 2, 2019, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which rates companies on governance risk, gave our company a 10, its highest risk category, for the Governance QualityScore.

Without equal voting rights, shareholders cannot hold management accountable. Shareholders are encouraged to vote FOR this good governance request to allow better shareholder oversight.

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